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RECENT CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE REGULATORY POWER OVER INTERsTATE COMMERCE.
-Appellant was charged with unlawfully transporting a dead animal, not
slaughtered and intended for human food, over a highway of this state to a
disposal plant located in Illinois. A statute limits transportation of such
animals to carriers of licensed operators of reduction plants in this state. He
was found guilty by the trial court and appealed, contending that the statute
imposes an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Held, affirmed.
The state could have provided that bodies of such animals, should be destroyed
without recompense to the owner;1 and also the state could have set up its
own disposal plants. Therefore, the animals were not proper subjects of
interstate commerce and the exclusive privilege of disposing of them could be
given to licensed disposal plants within the state. Clason v. State (Ind. 1938),
17 N. E. (2d) 92.
The states have always enjoyed, subject to the doctrine of federal super-
sedure, concurrent powers with the federal government as to the regulation of
interstate commerce local in nature2 and the Supreme Court has, from about
the latter part of the nineteenth century3 sustained state regulation of interstate
commerce national in scope, if such regulation is merely an exercise of the
state's general police power, and interstate commerce is only incidentally or
indirectly affected.
It is fundamentally a policy judgment as to whether a particular state
statute directly regulates interstate commerce and imposes thereon an unconsti-
1 This would be done under the police power and, of course, no compensation
would be necessary. City of New Orleans v. Charouleau (1908), 121 La. 890,
46 So. 911, 15 Ann. Cas. 46; Durand v. Dyson (1913), 217 Ill. 382, 111 N. E.
143, Ann. Cas. 1917 D, 84. Although such carcasses are not nuisances per se,
46 C. J. 691, perhaps, because the majority of such animals die from contagious
or infectious diseases (as the opinion signifies), the penumbra rule would apply,
i. e. "the power is not to be denied simply because some innocent article may
be found within the prescribed class." Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch
(1912), 226 U. S. 192, 33 Sup. Ct. 44. Because the carcasses would have such
a trifling value, the destruction could be by summary proceedings. Lawton v.
Steele (1894), 152 U. S. 133, 14 S. Ct. 499.
2 For an intelligible understanding and reconciling of the cases dealing with
a state's power to regulate interstate commerce, it is necessary that there be a
chronological division of our constitutional history and the various cases on
the subject be considered in view of the years in which divided. Apparently
only one writer on Constitutional Law has noticed and called attention to this
fact, viz., Willis, Constitutional Law, p. 307 ff. Prior to about 1851, the
federal government and the states exercised concurrent powers over interstate
commerce. Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. (1829), 2 Pet. 245. From
approximately that year until about 1894, the states continued to enjoy
concurrent powers as to matters local in nature, but over commerce national
in scope the power of congress was exclusive, Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens
(1851), 12 How. 299; Leisy v. Hardin (1890), 135 U. S. 100, 10 S. Ct. 681.
The situation since 1894 is developed in the body of the note and exemplified
by Plumley v. Mass. (1894-), 155 U. S. 461, 15 S. Ct. 154.
3 Plumley v. Mass. (1894), 155 U. S. 461, 15 S. Ct. 154-.
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tutional burden-with the United States Supreme Court the ultimate and final
arbiter. If the social interest which the state seeks to protect under its police
power is considered by the court to be paramount to the social interest in
"economic progress through free trade", the statute does not impose an undue
burden on interstate commerce. 4 A recent decision makes it clear that even
though the public interest which the state wishes to advance may be sufficient
to sustain the statute as to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
it may nevertheless be insufficient to uphold the statute against the attack of its
being an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce.5
The health of a state's inhabitants has long been recognized as a sufficient
social objective to outweigh the social interest in a free, untrammeled commerce.6
This is submitted to be the true basis of those cases upholding state statutes
having as their object the exclusion of disease-laden or obnoxious property
from the state.7 Admittedly, the dicta in a few scattered opinions would
indicate that the rationale for these cases is that such articles are not legitimate
subjects of commerce and a state is not regulating commerce when it prohibits
their importation or exportation. The fallacy in this reasoning appears when
one seeks to discover where lies the authority to say what is a legitimate
subject of commerce. The Supreme Court has definitely denied such a power
to the states. 8 It is doubtful whether this power should be attributed even to
Congress.9
Obviously, if the social interest in fostering a state's own businesses was
allowed to outweigh the advantages derived from having free commercial
intercourse, there would be an abnegation of the very policies sought to be
accomplished by expressly providing in the United States Constitution that
Congress shall have the power "to regulate commerce among the several
states". As a consequence the Supreme Court has always been extremely
4 Willis, Constitutional Law, p. 328.
5 Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig Inc. (1935), 294 U. S. 511, 55 S. Ct. 497.
Although the Supreme Court in Nebbia v. New York (1934), 291 U. S. 502,
54 S. Ct. 505, had held tha the social interest in preventing destructive compe-
tition and a consequent stabilization of the milk industry was sufficient to make
it due process of law for the state to fix the price of milk, yet this social
interest was inferior to the social interest in having an unobstructed commerce
in the buying and selling of milk among the several states. Consequently, the
court held in the Baldwin case that the fixing of prices of milk sold in
interstate commerce was unconstitutional because it was a "direct regulation
thereof".
6 Morgan v. Louisiana (1886), 118 U. S. 455, 6 S. Ct. 1114.
7 Crossman v. Lurman (1904), 192 U. S. 189, 24 S. Ct. 234; Missouri, Kansas,
and Texas R. Co. v. Haber (1898), 169 U. S. 613, 18 S. Ct. 488; Hygrade
Provision Co. v. Sherman (1925), 266 U. S. 497, 45 S. Ct. 141.
8 In Bowman v. Chicago R. Co. (1887), 125 U. S. 465, 8 S. Ct. 1062, at
p. 493, the court said that if it was left to each state to say what was a legiti-
mate article of traffic in the commerce of the country, each state could
"according to its own caprice and arbitrary will, discriminate for or against
every article grown, produced, manufactured, or sold in any state and sought
to be introduced as an article of commerce into any other."
9 It is submitted that the better rationale is that the power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce embraces the power to prohibit and the only
limitation on the exercise of this power is the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. See Willis, Constitutional Law, p. 338.
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hostile toward regulation of interstate commerce when the effect of such
regulation is the fostering of home industries.1 0
It being settled that the social interest of a state in protecting the health
of its citizens is sufficient, and the social interest in fostering home industries
not being sufficient to vindicate state interference with interstate commerce,
does the statute in the instant case involve the former or the latter or a
combination of the two? The declared purpose is the "limitation of the
spread of disease, the protection of the public health, and the prevention of
nuisances." Is not the primary purpose the fostering of Indiana disposal plants,
with the protection of health only secondary matter-only a peg upon which
to hang the constitutionality of the statute? If so it is a camouflage which
should not be tolerated. If in the judgment of the Supreme Court of the
United States the obvious effect of the statute is the encouragement of state
industries and only a remote possibility of there being a promotion of the
public health, the invalidity of it is cerain.1 1
Another approach to the constitutionality of the statute is the proposition
that no state can validly discriminate against interstate commerce. 1 2 Conceding
that the state could have prohibited all commerce in dead animals provided the
true purpose of such action was protection of the public health, it did not see
fit to do so. Instead, it recognized not only intrastate commerce in such
property, but also some interstate, inasmuch as it allowed transportation of
carcasses into the state. In prohibiting vehicles from hauling dead animals out
of the state, the discrimination was most evident. This the constitution
prohibits even though the declared purpose is the limitation of the spread of
disease. 1 3
It is only natural that a state court deciding a case involving the relative
powers of the two units of government would be influenced by a policy
antagonistic to the present trend of the federal government to assume greater
powers and correlatively delimit the state's sphere of action. The Commerce
power being one of the strongest bulwarks behind which the encroachments
of the national government have been entrenched, can it be questioned that
a state court might be prone to deviate somewhat from established legal
principles in order to sustain the constitutionality of a state statute which is
allegedly an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce.
lORailroad Co. v. Husen (1877), 95 U. S. 465; Foster-Fountain Packing
Co. v. Haydel (1928), 278 U. S. 1, 49 S. Ct. 1.
11 Baldwin v. Seelig (1935), 294 U. S. 511, 55 S. Ct. 497. The argument
in this case was that the supply of pure and wholesome milk was put in
jeopardy when the dairymen of the state were unable to earn a living income.
The court in repudiating this argument admitted that "economic welfare is
always related to health, for there can be no health if men are starving," but
if "such an exception be admitted, all that a state will have to do in times of
stress and strain is to say that its farmers and merchants and workmen must
be protected gainst competition from without, lest they go upon the poor relief
lists or perish altogether. To give entrance to that excuse would be to invite
a speedy end of our national solidarity."
12 Welton v. Missouri (1875), 91 U. S. 275.
13 Schollenberger v. Penna. (1897), 171 U. S. 1, 18 S. Ct. 757; Brimmer v.
Rebman (1890), 138 U. S. 78, 11 S. Ct. 213; Minnesota v. Barber (1890),
136 U. S. 313, 10 S. Ct 862; Voight v. Wright (1890), 141 U. S. 62, 11 S. Ct.
855.
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Assuming this political philosophy may be a commendable one, it does not
seem that the instant case was a proper one in which to give vent to it. The
statute was obviously actuated by local interests. It is difficult to see just how
the public health will be protected when the practical effect of the statute will
be not to decrease the number of diseased carcasses to which the state's
citizens will be exposed, but actually to increase them. This is a certainty,
whereas the court's reasoning that the disposal plants will need this increase
in order to operate profitably is merely conjectural. If the legislation is not
violative of both the letter and policy underlying the commerce clause of the
Constitution, it seems that it would be difficult to enact legislation having that
result. J.M.C.
CONTRACTs-DISCHARGE BY PARTIAL PAYMENT.-An agreement was executed
between the maker, payee, and indorsee of a note whereby after maturity the
payee delivered the note to the indorsee for a car valued at $250, an amount
less than the note, and the indorsee was to discharge the maker in consideration
of the receipt of livestock also valued at $250. After getting the livestock,
the indorsee brings action for the amount unpaid under the note, alleging the
discharge ineffective because of lack of consideration. Held: The discharge is
binding. Rye -v. Phillips (Minn. 1938), 282 N. W. 459.
For a binding promise to discharge a contract there must be consideration.'
Consideration is one of the fundamental requisites of modern bargain contract
law 2 and is the giving up of a right, power, privilege, or immunity.3 The
promise to perform or the performance of a pre-existing legal duty owed to
the promisor is not consideration for a new promise by the promisor nor will
it support a promise to discharge, because no legal interest is given up by the
promisee; 4 therefore the promise to pay or the payment of part of a liquidated
1 4 Page on Contracts p. 4359, § 2461 (1920) "As in case of other contracts,
a subsequent contract which is to operate as a complete discharge or a
modification of a prior contract must itself be supported by sufficient con-
sideration." In the present case there is no mention of the fact that the
promissory note should be governed by Negotiable Instruments Law which
allows a renunciation by the holder's rights when made in writing or by
delivery of the instrument to the person charged to be effective without
consideration. In the absence of such renunciation here, the case is governed
by the law of simple contracts. Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 119(4)
See Brannan on Negotiable Instruments Law (6th ed. 1938) p. 1955; Mason's
Minn. Statutes, (1927) §§ 7162 and 7165; Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. (1933),
§§ 19-801 and 19-804.
2 "Consideration, offer, and acceptance are an indivisible trinity, facets
of one identical notion which is that of bargain." Hansom, The Reform of
Consideration, 54 L. Q. Rev. 233, 234 (1938).
aWillis, H. E., Consideration in Anglo American Law of Contracts,
8 Ind. L. J1. 93, 111 (1932).
4 Davis v. Morgan (1903), 117 Ga. 504, 43 S. E. 732. The promise to
perform or performance of a pre-existing legal duty to a third person may
be held supported by consideration because the promisee gives up the privilege
of offering recision to the third party. DeCiccio v. Schweitzer et al. (1917),
221 N. Y. 431, 117 N. E. 807; Restatement, Contracts (1932), § 84 (d). The
weight of authority, however is contra. 13 C. J. 356.
